The wonders of academia

I became a full professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2001. Among the responsibilities of full professors are (1) to evaluate whether professor at schools other than ours merit promotion and (2) to chair and serve on promotion committees at our own schools.

So far as I can tell, senior faculty take these responsibilities very seriously. The strange part is that we take promotions of people at other schools very seriously, even though we compete with those very schools. I suppose one could make an argument that we at USC should try to blow up the cases of those who we deem to be good at other schools in California, while also waxing enthusiastic about weaker faculty at these schools. It is as if Honda were telling Toyota who to promote, and vice versa.

In the end, though, faculty at one school tend to recommend that faculty they deem meritorious at another receive promotion. While the process is certainly less than perfect, the good faith that most faculty show in these affairs helps explain why the US still has the best research universities in the world.

Did Californians break their contract?

Mark Thoma, whom I admire, approvingly posts Michael O'Hare's letter to his students. Professor O'Hare says something that really bothers me:

...for a variety of reasons, California voters realized that while they had done very well from the existing contract, they could do even better by walking away from their obligations and spending what they had inherited on themselves. “My kids are finished with school; why should I pay taxes for someone else’s? Posterity never did anything for me!”

As Professor O'Hare correctly notes in the header to his blog, "everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts."

So before we accuse middle-aged Californians of being greedy, we should consider four things. First, California ranks 4th in state and local per capita spending in the country (and number one is Alaska, where the tax price of government service is essentially zero). Second, about 2/3 of California bond referenda that go to the public receive the 2/3 super-majority necessary to get passed. Third, we in Los Angeles County voted two years ago, in the middle of a recession, to tax ourselves to pay for transportation infrastructure. Finally, we absorb more people from the rest of the world relative to our population than any other state. These facts are more consistent with generosity than greed.

I understand Professor O'Hare's frustration with California's state budget process and with the threats against the wonderful UC and Cal State systems. Those who know me know that I enthusiastically support all kinds of public spending. But Professor O'Hare's rhetoric could well alienate many whom he wants on his side, and may actually give aid and comfort to the Sarah Palins and Glenn Becks of the world.

Maybe we are more like Homer Simpson than Spock

I saw Juan Carrillo of the USC economics department present a very nice paper testing auction theory using experimental data. The only problem was that the people in the experiment were Cal Tech students, who are not exactly representative. But even Cal Tech students, while likely more rational than the general population, and who certainly understand experiments better than the general population, are still far less than perfectly rational.

What is the correct downpayment?

If required down-payments are too low, we get the nonsense of the past several years. I am reasonably sure zero is too low. If required down-payments are too high, we, among other things, perpetuate wealth disparities (i.e., the only people who get credit are those that don't need it). I am reasonably sure that 25 percent is too high.

What is both socially optimal and just? We need to try to figure this out, but it would involve knowing the correct social loss function and then minimizing it. Social welfare functions are very, very tricky businesses.

In praise of Lawrence Yun

As Robbie Whelen notes in the Wall Street Journal, it could not have been fun to be Lawrence Yun, the National Association of Realtors chief economist, today. As Whelen notes, he must "toe the line between housing industry economist and housing industry motivational speaker."

I think Lawrence does this well--he is clearly on the side of the people who pay him, but he also takes his positions honestly. I assume that he had something to do with NAR's decision not to advocate for an extension of the home buying tax credit. More important, he is in charge of the data that NAR puts out, and bad days like today essentially prove that the data are credible (full disclosure: I, along with Orawin Velz and Kevin Thorpe, helped design the methods by which the Existing Home Sales data are produced, but I have nothing to do with the monthly estimates that NAR puts out). I am guessing that one or two members of NAR wish he would fudge the data, but he does not.

No more goosing with tax credits please.

The July Existing Home Sales number of 3.8 million units was abysmal--it was 1980s bad. I am guessing that a lot is it is that July gave back the tax credit driven boost of spring. If we look at average sales for the year, it is 5.1 million, which is pretty much normal. March, April, May and June were above normal, but all of that "strength" was given back in July. Credits just pull sales forward--they don't change the underlying dynamic, and they add to the deficit.

Is housing the best way for low-income people to build wealth?

I was thrilled to be invited to the Future of Housing Finance conference held at the Treasury Department and co-sponsored by HUD this week. It was particularly nice to be seated next to Self-Help's Martin Eakes, whom I have admired for some time. Like Elizabeth Warren, Eakes long ago had insights into sub-prime lending that I wish more of us had taken seriously.

At the conference, Martin worried about a conversation that emphasized the need for robust underwriting standards for the mortgage market going forward. The three most important standards are loan-to-value ratio, payment-to-income ratio, and credit history. As Martin pointed out, African-Americans have less wealth available for down-payment than others (even after controlling for income), and have lower FICO scores than others, and therefore will be denied access to credit at a greater rate than others if underwriting standards are tough and uniform. Because much of the reason that African-Americans lack wealth is because they have been systematically stripped of wealth for many generations, policies that reduce access to credit disproportionately for African-Americans violate fairness.

The events of the past six or seven years show that loose underwriting does nobody any favors, either. Foreclosures are terrible things for the families who experience them and for the communities that have large numbers of them. The whole point of underwriting is to prevent default and foreclosure, and the unpleasant fact is that downpayment and FICO are predictors of likelihood of default.

In the era where almost all mortgages were self-amortizing, housing allowed families to build wealth because mortgages were a form of forced saving. Those who got a 20 year mortgage in 1960 owned their house free and clear in 1980; households gained wealth not because housing was such a great investment, but because they built equity, month after month. Housing was a particularly attractive way for those of modest means to save, because they could live in the very piggy bank they were building. In principle, however, these households could have rented and taken the difference between a mortgage payment and a rental payment and put it in another investment (a small business or the stock market). But we know that in the absence of nudges, people tend to save less.

Perhaps, then, the government could come at the savings issue more directly by giving low-income people a nudge toward saving. Suppose it developed a 401(k) type plan that matched the savings of those with below-median incomes at 2 to 1. This would encourage savings that then could be used for a down payment or a host of other investments (say a Vanguard index fund). This would cost taxpayers money, but perhaps less than mortgage programs built on thin underwriting standards. At the same time, getting people into the habit of savings could produce other social benefits as well. I am not sure such a plan is practical, but I think we do need to think about how we can help people who have been denied wealth for generations how to start accumulating assets without relying entirely on the housing finance system to do it.